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Abstract 
 
There is little doubt within the scientific community about the need for immediate 
action to reduce the magnitude and impacts of Anthropogenic Climate Change (ACC).  
To reduce carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions effective climate solutions will 
require the engagement and collective action of millions of people and thousands of 
organizations in the United States and other countries including Canada. Unfortunately, 
the urgency understood and felt in the scientific community has not translated to wide-
spread pro-environmental action from the public at large, or in adequate government 
policy to mitigate climate change. Effective and targeted engagement strategies to 
improve pro-environmental behaviors remain a challenge for policy makers and 
communicators. 
This study applies a segmentation methodology developed for the United States 
(Maibach, Lesierowitz, Roser-Renouf & Mertz. 2011a) to a nationally representative 
Canadian audience. The segmentation places Canadians into six distinct groups, the “Six 
Canadas of Climate Change,” based on their beliefs, motivations and policy preferences 
around ACC. Segmentation is a methodology borrowed from other social sciences to 
divide populations into distinct groups homogenous with respect to certain attributes such 
as beliefs, behaviors and ideology (Maibach et al., 2011a). Having identified segments 
allows communicators to target specific and meaningful communications targeted to 
groups whose beliefs, preferences and motivations are known.   
  The utility of this climate change segmentation tool is assessed by measuring its 
ability to predict respondent’s willingness to support a series of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
reduction policies. Linear regression models are used to assess demographic variables, 
political views and the segmentation as predictors of GHG mitigating policy support. All 
of these variables are to some degree predictive, but the segmentation best explains 
variation in policy preferences.   
There are significant differences in views on ACC between the United States and 
Canada. This study offers analysis of those differences and opportunities for future 
research to improve and target climate communications to distinct audience segments.  
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Terms and Acronyms 
  
Climate Change Mitigation: “Mitigation is a human intervention to reduce the 
sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases” (Pachauri et al., 2014, p. 4). 
Discrete Emotions: distinct emotional states with unique action tendencies 
including the beliefs, motivations and behaviors aroused (Quick, Kam, Morgan, Montero 
Liberona & Smith, 2015). 
IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.  A body consisting of 
thousands of scientists which collaborate to review, understand and report on the current 
status of climate change (Pachauri et al., 2014). 
Six Americas: a segmentation developed by Maibach, Leiserowitz, Roser-Renouf 
& Mertz (2011a) to categorize Americans across a continuum of belief in anthropogenic 
climate change and their willingness to support various types and levels of pro-
environmental behaviors. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
There is little doubt within the scientific community about the need for immediate 
action to reduce the magnitude and impacts of anthropogenic climate change (ACC). The 
IPCC in its Fifth Assessment Report notes that half of the cumulative anthropogenic 
carbon emissions since the beginning of the industrial revolution in 1750 have occurred 
in the past 40 years, with growth in population, and economic-drivers fostering the 
persistence of these emissions (Pachauri et al., 2014). The IPCC therefore continues to 
call for immediate drastic reductions in carbon emissions to mitigate further warming 
(Pachauri et al., 2014). To effectively reduce carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions 
effective climate solutions will require the engagement and collective action of millions 
of people and thousands of organizations in the United States and other countries 
including Canada. Some scientists are considering the “Anthropocene” as a new epoch 
functionally different than the last 11,000 years of the Holocene due to the distinct 
footprint being left by humans in the stratigraphic record (Waters et al., 2016). Closing 
the gap between the scientific consensus on ACC, and the collective beliefs and behavior 
required to address it, will require constructive engagement of all agents whose choices 
may impact the environment.  
Unfortunately, the urgency understood and felt in the scientific community has 
not translated to widespread pro-environmental action from the public at large, or in 
adequate government policy to mitigate climate change. As individuals, industrial 
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organizations and governments pursue their own immediate self-interests, with a lack of a 
coordinated and agreed upon climate response, we are unlikely to make positive 
environmental decisions. As game theory teaches us, when agents make self-motivated 
choices, they may make themselves collectively worse off they had not pursued that 
interest in the first place (Singer, 1999). We must recognize and understand the 
differences in how people form beliefs from their varied backgrounds, experiences and 
values (Leiserowitz, Maibach & Roser-Renouf, 2009). 
Despite calls to drastically reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the United 
States and Canada are amongst the highest emitters of GHGs per capita (Pachauri et al., 
2014). Specifically, from fossil fuel use, the United States is the second highest emitter of 
GHGs and Canada is the ninth (Olivier, Janssens-Maenhout, Muntean & Peters, 2014). 
Climate change is a wicked problem “that defies resolution because of the enormous 
interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders implicated by 
any effort to develop a solution” (Lazarus, 2008, p. 1159). Nations and institutions 
attempting to mitigate climate change “face a financial disincentive to solving the 
problem….with no central authority that has the ability to address the problem” (Perry, 
2015, p. 3). Thus wicked problems are outside of the control of any single entity and thus 
require mutual commitment and action from multiple groups, institutions, corporations, 
levels of government and individuals. 
Meanwhile an organized campaign of denial and misinformation has further 
hampered movement toward pro-environmental behaviors (Dunlap, 2013). Climate 
science denial appears to be on the rise in and it appears to be aligned with partisan 
political ideologies (McCright, Dunlap & Xiao, 2014). Therefore, finding a way to 
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combat politically driven skepticism on ACC, through effective targeted science and 
value-based communication, is essential for encouraging more pro-environmental 
behaviors. 
A variety of studies have measured extent of belief in ACC in the United States 
and elsewhere including Canada. Lachapelle, Borick & Rabe (2014) for example found 
that in 2013 a full 81% of Canadians believed the Earth is warming compared to 61% in 
the United States. As to whether they believe it is attributable to human causes rather than 
purely natural ones the number of Canadians drops to 51%, and the number of Americans 
drops to 40% (Lachapelle et al., 2014).  A Pew Research Centre (2013) study found that 
only 40% of Americans see climate change as a major threat, while 54% of Canadians, 
and an average of 54% of individuals across all other countries surveyed, see global 
warming as a major threat. Over 97% of scientific peer-reviewed research, on the other 
hand, supports that the Earth is warming, and the cause is anthropogenic (Cook et al., 
2013).  There is thus a division of opinion between the scientific community and the 
general public on the seriousness and etiology of climate change. Improving widespread 
understanding of anthropogenic impacts on the climate are crucial for building sufficient 
political will to mitigate climate change (Bliuc et al., 2015).  
 
Forming Beliefs on Climate Change 
Organized science denial is not the only barrier to effective pro-environmental 
policy and behaviors. With the lower level of acceptance of ACC in the United States 
much of the research on climate science skepticism appears to be focussed there, with 
little comparable research in Canada. A variety of contextual factors impact how we form 
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beliefs on climate change beyond the information itself (Lu & Schuldt, 2015). A 
significant amount of research has gone into understanding how people in particular are 
divided on the issues of ACC based on political ideology, religious identification, moral 
values and level of scientific understanding. 
 
Political Ideology 
In the United States acceptance of climate science has been closely aligned with 
political ideology. Ideologically driven campaigns have attempted to deny the reality of 
ACC by manufacturing uncertainty in the science (Dunlap, 2013). These contrarian 
campaigns have been largely driven by fossil fuel interests and conservative think tanks 
(Dunlap, 2013). They have also been heavily supported by carbon-based industries 
(Boykoff, 2015), which like other environmentally regulated industries such as mining, 
utilities and chemicals, have made significant endorsements to conservative political 
parties such as the Tea Party (Hamilton & Saito, 2015).   
These campaigns appear to be working as there is increasing public perception 
that scientists disagree on climate change (McCright et al., 2014). According to Borick, 
Lachapelle and Rabe (2011) partisan affiliation is the biggest predictor on beliefs on 
ACC in the United States. Conservative voters in the United States are less supportive of 
energy efficient technologies than their more liberal counterparts, and they are less likely 
to spend money on energy-efficient products (Gromet, Kunreuther & Larrick, 2013). 
Interestingly, the increase in climate science denial is also more prominent amongst 
conservative white males than other demographic groups (McCright & Dunlap, 2011).  
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Dunlap (2013) describes the ACC denial continuum with those in complete denial 
on one end, who will hold their beliefs regardless of evidence, and those who are at least 
open to a dialogue on the merits of the science on the other end. Amongst conservatives 
in the United States, Tea Party supporters were significantly less likely than non-Tea 
Party Republicans to trust scientists on environmental issues or to believe in ACC 
(Hamilton & Saito, 2015). Despite this, according to Hamilton and Saito (2015), Tea 
Party supporters are more confident in their climate views than other Republicans are, 
and less likely to be swayed by scientific evidence. 
This finding is not restricted to the United States. A meta-analysis of close to 200 
studies and polls from 56 nations found that political ideology was the largest 
demographic correlate for climate change belief (Hornsey, Harris, Bain & Fielding, 
2016). Partisan divides are similar in Canada with more left-leaning voters being more 
likely to accept ACC than their more conservative counterparts (Lachapelle et al., 2014).  
Canada’s recently overturned Conservative government, led by Stephen Harper, led two 
reframing initiatives to rebrand Alberta’s oil sands as “ethical oil” and to label 
environmentalists as “radicals” (Gutstein, 2015). According to Gutstein (2015), the 
Harper government promoted an “anthropocentric” view where the world exists for 
human consumption, as opposed to the “ecocentric” view held by environmentalists that 
advocates for the flourishing of all species. It is therefore not surprising that oil-rich 
Alberta and the prairie provinces have some of the lowest rates of belief in climate 
change in Canada (Mildenberger et al., 2016). 
In Australia, Unsworth and Fielding (2014) found that people were more likely to 
be polarized on ACC when their political affiliation was salient. In other words, when put 
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into the context of their political alliances, individuals, particularly on the right-end of the 
spectrum, were more likely to diverge from the science of ACC and align with the 
ideology of their party. But, when not thinking about their political identity they were 
more likely to be open to accepting ACC. The polarization for left-wing respondents was 
more negligible in this study, leading the authors to suggest that this phenomenon is more 
prominent for conservatives (Unsworth & Fielding, 2014).  
According to McCright, Dunlap & Marquart-Pyatt (2016) the European Union 
(EU) has seen a similar left to right divide in views on climate change. These authors 
found that in Western European countries, those on the left of the political spectrum were 
more likely to believe in ACC, perceive it as a problem, and be willing to accept the costs 
of addressing it. This finding was not significant in former communist countries within 
the EU, however (McCright et al., 2016). Dubbed the “post-communist effect,” citizens 
in these countries do not consistently connect environmental beliefs to political and social 
identities as much as they do in the western countries (Chasity & Whitefield, 2015).  
Thus, with few exceptions, right-wing political ideology is a significant predictor of 
diminished climate change belief in many of the world’s developed nations. 
 
Religious Identification 
In his 2006 book The Creation, E.O. Wilson made a plea to evangelical Christians 
in the U.S. to embrace a moral responsibility to take care of the Earth (Wilson, 2006).  
Written as a letter to a Baptist Minister, Wilson acknowledges that while science and 
religion have different views on Earth’s beginnings or genesis, we share a common moral 
duty to preserve it to sustain human life. However, in the United States at least, religious 
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values have not necessarily translated to an acceptance of climate change or a moral duty 
to care for the Earth.    
In 2007, the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) endorsed the 
Evangelical Climate Initiative, an initiative to mitigate carbon emissions through market 
forces (Chaudoin, Smith & Urpelainen, 2014). In the same year, however, the Southern 
Baptist Convention proclaimed:   
That we consider proposals to regulate CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions 
based on a maximum acceptable global temperature goal to be very dangerous, 
since attempts to meet the goal could lead to a succession of mandates of deeper 
cuts in emissions, which may have no appreciable effect if humans are not the 
principal cause of global warming, and could lead to major economic hardships 
on a worldwide scale (Southern Baptist Convention, 2007, para. 24). 
 
Amongst American evangelicals there has been a distrust of initiatives requiring 
international cooperation (Chaudoin et al., 2014), which present an issue for climate 
change communicators. People of faith may view the climate to be in the hands of God, 
and may question whether they truly can or should interfere with a divine hand.  
With his encyclical in June of 2015, Pope Francis called for a new dialogue 
between religion and science for how we shape our planet, arguing it is a moral 
imperative to take care of the Earth (Francis, 2015). In Laudato Si, Francis (2015) calls 
for universal solidarity to overcome the challenges of climate change in spite of its many 
obstacles that include both concerted opposition and a widespread apathy.  He cautions 
against having blind faith in technology to solve this problem, and urges a new dialogue 
for universal action (Francis, 2015). This reframing of global warming as a religious 
issue has not been confined to Catholics, as some leaders in the Evangelical-Christian, 
Jewish, Muslim and Episcopal communities too have recently communicated this to their 
members (Roser-Renouf, Maibach, Leiserowitz, Feinberg & Rosenthal, 2016). 
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Just prior to Francis’ encyclical Roser-Renouf et al. (2016) set out to evaluate 
how Americans view climate change in terms of their moral and religious values. In a 
survey conducted in the spring of 2015 they found that while a majority of Americans 
consider themselves highly religious or spiritual, only a small percentage of the 
population sees global warming as a religious (10%) or spiritual (13%) issue. These 
researchers found that the American public varies widely in its views on climate change.  
They further found that some segments of the American population would weigh a 
religious explanation higher than a scientific one if the two are at odds, and a smaller 
segment said they would choose the scientific one (Roser-Renouf et al., 2016). 
Messaging from religious leaders therefore offers potential hope for climate change 
communicators looking for a path to convince a population that may otherwise be 
skeptical. It remains to be seen whether this new plea from Pope Francis for 
environmental stewardship translates to sustained modified behaviors from followers in 
the future, as is whether the climate-denial machine will alter its climate communications 
to adapt to this framing, as it is surely contrary to capitalist free-market ideology.   
 
Level of Scientific Knowledge 
While past research has shown that climate change skepticism may be partially 
attributed to a gap in knowledge, it is well known that this is far more complicated than 
insufficient education efforts (Corner & Groves, 2014). A recent survey of American 
teachers found that only 30% of middle school and 45% of high school teachers knew the 
correct extent of scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change (Plutzer et al., 
2016). This same study found that science teachers had limited training on climate 
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change, lacked specific knowledge on a wide range of evidence, and in a small number of 
cases, felt pressured to teach one way or another. Thus, some teachers felt a need to teach 
“both sides” due to their own lack of understanding and to appease views held by parents, 
administrators and the community (Plutzer et al., 2016).   
  If people make poor environmental choices due to a lack of scientific literacy, 
then we would expect to see beliefs and behaviors improve with increasing science 
education. This finding has not held in practice as studies have shown that even 
scientifically educated people may fail to make informed decisions about climate change. 
Sterman (2008) found that a group of highly scientifically educated people demonstrated 
a lack of understanding of basic climate dynamics. Kahan et al. (2012) found that 
technical reasoning capacity and scientific literacy were not predictive of concern for 
climate change. They found instead that humans are well-equipped to use their 
knowledge and reasoning ability to advance their self-interests and support their existing 
views (Kahan et al., 2012). Hornsey et al. (2016) reported that overall education did have 
a small positive effect in predicting belief in climate change. 
Beyond basic awareness, public engagement must acknowledge that 
understanding of ACC is embedded in linguistic and cultural values and norms (Hanson-
Easy, Williams, Hansen, Fogarty & Bi, 2015).  People may shy away from evidence if 
that evidence leads to outcomes that are not desired or favorable (Leiserowitz, Maibach, 
Roser-Renouf & Feinberg & Howe, 2013).  For those who are not climate scientists the 
communication they receive on climate science is typically mediated through other 
institutions they may or may not identify with and thus those communications may come 
with other competing values and beliefs (Corner & Groves, 2014). Engagement efforts 
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should therefore not only reduce the gap in scientific knowledge, but also between its 
impacts and personal values (Scannell & Gifford, 2013). It is perhaps questionable 
whether detailed understanding of the technical aspects of global warming is necessary 
for public support of environmental protection, or whether communication efforts should 
be focussed on other influencers on the human decision making process. 
 
Reasoning 
Taking knowledge a step further, some social psychologists have investigated our 
ability to reason as a factor in our decision making around climate change and other 
issues. After reviewing extensive past research on motivated reasoning, Mercier and 
Sperber (2011) conclude that reasoning’s function is to persuade, rather than to find truth, 
leaving humans susceptible to misinformation. They argue that while “reasoning is 
generally seen as a means to improve knowledge, and make better decisions…it often 
leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions” (Mercier and Sperber, 2011, p.57).  
Haidt (2012) has come to a similar conclusion: “Anyone who values truth should 
stop worshipping reason” (p.104). After years and multiple studies Haidt, a moral 
psychologist, has tried to understand how presumably equally rational individuals can be 
so polarized on topics such as politics, religion and climate change. Haidt argues that 
morality is the key to understanding humanity.  He defines moral systems as 
“interlocking sets of values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, 
technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or 
regulate self interest and make cooperative societies possible” (p. 292).  His research has 
led him to argue that it is in fact our intuitions that drive our moral actions and not our 
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reasoning. He provides a metaphor of the mind being an elephant (intuition), served by its 
rider (reason), rather than the other way around. The rider, according to Haidt, is much 
like a press secretary serving their president – using reason to get through difficult 
questions to support an agenda, or to defend prior decisions or behaviors (Haidt, 2012).   
The conclusions of psychologists such as Mercier, Sperber and Haidt may be 
open to debate. Their work however does lend support to the notion that humans are 
complex in the way we process information, form beliefs and make decisions to serve our 
interests and values. Knowledge and reason alone may not be enough to persuade 
skeptics and doubters to accept the conclusions of scientists, when an internet search can 
readily reveal contrarian information or “evidence” that supports their firmly held beliefs 
(Haidt, 2012). Thus fact-supporting charts, figures, graphs and data, no matter how 
scientifically sound, may be of little value to promoting pro-environmental behaviors in 
climate change skeptics. For that reason it is arguably important for climate change 
communicators to have a greater understanding of their audience and to know what 
motivates their values and decision making.  
This is not to imply that things are hopeless, or that there is no value in reason.  
Unbiased reasoning is simply more likely to occur when individuals sincerely seek the 
truth rather than to win the debate (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). Thus if reason and 
knowledge are not enough, we need to better understand how people inform their views 
and behaviors, and perhaps to whom we are talking to when targeting our 
communications, or trying to steer the elephant.    
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Emerging Research 
While how we frame beliefs on ACC can be linked to the salience of our political, 
moral and religious beliefs, another line of reasoning suggests that ACC is better 
understood as an intergroup conflict between believers and skeptics, rather than between 
scientists and certain members of the public (Bliuc et al., 2015). These two groups have 
“distinct social identities, beliefs and emotional reactions that systematically predict their 
support for action to advance their respective positions” (Bliuc et al., 2015, p. 226). Thus 
according to these authors while beliefs on ACC, or for that matter, gay marriage, 
abortion or gun rights, may emerge from political, moral and religious beliefs, they 
cannot be simply reduced to them.   
An interesting new area of research has emerged proposing that in addition to the 
political, religious and moral values we hold, our belief in ACC can also be informed or 
altered through discreet or incidental emotions. Discrete emotions are typically one-word 
emotions such as fear, worry, anger or guilt (Lu & Schuldt, 2015; Smith & Leiserowitz, 
2014) and can be defined as distinct emotional states with unique action tendencies 
including the beliefs, motivations and behaviors aroused (Quick et al., 2015).   
It is accepted in social sciences that these types of emotions may influence 
attitudes, intentions and behaviors (Yoo, Kreuter, Lai & Fu, 2014). Lu and Schuldt 
(2015) investigated how the emotions of guilt and anger could mitigate support for 
proactive climate policy. In their study they assigned participants to one of two emotion 
based treatments (guilt or anger) and then measured their willingness to support an 
environmental policy. They found that guilt significantly led to increased willingness to 
support environmental policy compared to controls, while there was no such finding with 
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anger. Smith and Leiserowitz (2014) found that worry, hope and interest had a positive 
impact on support for pro-environmental policy. They found that discreet emotions had 
greater strength for modifying willingness for policy support than cultural views, 
negative affect or socio-demographic variables (Smith & Leiserowitz, 2014).  Further 
research is required for understanding how each of these emotions can impact attitudes 
toward climate policy and more specifically, how different groups of people will react to 
each emotion. 
 
Audience Segmentation 
To better understand how the general American views the issue of climate 
change, a group of researchers at Yale University and George Mason University (herein 
referred to as “the Yale Team”) have conducted repeated national surveys since 2008 (see 
most recently Roser-Renouf et al., 2016).  These studies have additionally asked 
Americans about their climate related behaviors and policy preferences for mitigating 
ACC. In their research they have found that there are in fact six distinct segments of 
Americans who differ in their views on climate change, on a relative continuum of full 
belief in ACC through to denial.  These “Six Americas of Climate Change” are the 
Alarmed, Concerned, Cautious, Disengaged, Doubtful and Dismissive with the first four 
being accepting of climate change to some degree the and the remainder ranging from 
doubtful to denial.  The survey was first put in the field in 2008 (Leiserowitz, Roser-
Renouf & Smith, 2009) and has been repeated several times. This has allowed the Yale 
Team to monitor changes in segments over time. It is also a useful framework for 
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measuring ongoing shifts in climate change attitudes, as well as acceptance of climate 
policy amongst Americans. 
The Yale Team argues that given that people vary in their experiences, values and 
knowledge, it is important to “know thy audience” in devising effective communication 
strategies for engaging the various segments in positive environmental behaviors 
(Leiserowitz et al., 2009). They point out we must understand how individuals in each of 
these distinct segments perceives the threat of climate change, what they currently 
believe in the science, how they intend to act and what their current policy preferences 
are. Armed with this knowledge, we can the devise communication strategies to promote 
better individual decision-making and support, for advancing systemic change to manage 
this issue (Leiserowitz et al., 2009). 
Segmentation research is not new and has previously been used in areas such as 
public health and political strategy. Behavioral scientists have long known that people 
will respond uniquely to varying messages and motivators, depending on their own 
experiences and values (Hornik, 2002). Political strategists have also used this 
information to isolate messaging to specific groups of voters to maximize returns on their 
campaign efforts (Sosnik, Fournier & Dowd, 2007). More recently, social media 
companies use segmentation methodologies to target specific ads and content based on 
users’ behaviors and online profiles (Hine et al., 2014). Given the differences in human 
values, beliefs and behaviors, climate science communicators can ill afford costly 
communication strategies that are not tailored to their audience. Audience segmentation 
therefore offers the ability to identify distinct groups of people who vary in their beliefs 
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and motivations, and to whom specific targeted communications may be more 
meaningful (Leiseowitz et al., 2009). 
 
Segmentation in the American Context 
The research by the Yale Team showed how the six distinct segments of 
Americans differ in the following ways on climate change: beliefs and issue involvement; 
expected outcomes from action to reduce global warming; policy and national response 
preferences; personal actions and intentions; demographics, social characteristics and 
values, and; media use and information sharing. According to Leiserowitz et al. (2013) 
the Alarmed (12%) are the most concerned about global warming, believe it is primarily 
human-caused, and are the most likely to take action or support environmental policy.  
The Concerned (29%) agree that climate change is a serious issue that needs immediate 
attention, but they are not as likely as the Alarmed to take personal action. The Cautious 
(26%) believe that global warming is happening, but they do not see it as an immediate 
threat and do not believe that any immediate action is necessary.  Moving further to the 
right on the continuum the Disengaged (7%) do not give much thought to whether or not 
it is happening but members of this group are the most open to changing their views.  The 
Doubtful (15%) meanwhile are not certain whether global warming is happening but 
believe that if it is, the causes are a natural climatic cycle that has little to do with human 
activity.  Finally, the Dismissive (11%) believe that global warming is not happening and 
like the Alarmed are the most likely to be active in promoting their beliefs and taking 
action on the issue (characterizations from Leiserowitz et al., 2013; percentages from 
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Roser-Renouf et al., 2016).  The following summarizes how Leiserowitz et al. (2013) 
evaluated the way in which the six Americas differ in each of these characterizations: 
• Beliefs and issue involvement: the surveys examined level and certainty of belief in 
climate change, its personal importance, and the amount of thought and worry 
respondents give to the subject for themselves and future generations. Further they 
asked how much knowledge respondents feel they have, what the causes of climate 
change are and the level of scientific consensus.   
• Expected outcomes from action to reduce global warming: responses from each of the 
six segments were collected on the expected outcomes of human action to reduce 
ACC including number of positive outcomes, negative outcomes and the 
effectiveness of personal pro-environmental actions if adopted widely. None of the 
segments are confident that we will reduce ACC, but a majority from the Alarmed, 
Concerned, Cautious and Disengaged believe that we can do so if the United States 
takes appropriate actions.  
• Policy and national response preferences: the surveys measured support for a variety 
of national policies to address climate change. These included signing treaties to 
reduce GHG emissions, regulating CO2 as a pollutant, regulating vehicle fuel 
efficiency, providing rebates for purchasing solar panels or fuel-efficient cars, and 
support for cap and trade policies.   
• Personal actions and intentions: the surveys measured personal actions taken to 
reduce the impacts of ACC including contacting elected officials, rewarding pro-
environmental companies with spending, intentions to engage in consumer activism, 
 17 
steps to improve energy consumption in the home, habitual actions to reduce carbon 
footprint, and number of communications with others on ACC.  
• Demographics, social characteristics and values: in order to understand the six 
segments, the study identified basic demographic data as well as political party 
affiliation, religious beliefs and alignment to egalitarian values.   
• Media use and information seeking: the study evaluated both the level and types of 
information sought including attention paid to global warming information as well as 
the level of trust in scientists and in the media.   
This data thus enabled the authors to characterize each of the six Americas in 
terms of risk perceptions, how they receive information, their desired response, if any, 
and personal intentions with respect to the issue. Armed with this information climate 
change communicators can devise and test different messaging strategies that are specific 
and effective for each of the segments.   
In the survey conducted in 2012, the Alarmed, Concerned and Cautious made up 
70% of the population with the Concerned filling the largest segment at 29% 
(Leiserowitz et al., 2012).  Thus the majority of Americans at that time supported some 
type of action on climate change.  By monitoring over time they found that from the 
baseline 2008 segmentations the number of Alarmed and Concerned actually shrank by 
2010 while the number of Dismissive almost doubled.  By 2012 these numbers had 
rebounded slightly showing a gradual trend towards a greater number of believers 
(Leiserowitz et al., 2012).  By 2015 the percentage of Alarmed, Concerned and Cautious 
had actually decreased again to 66%.   In all surveys the two most polarized groups of 
Americans (Alarmed and Dismissive) are the most involved in their activities to promote 
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or dismiss the need for climate mitigation strategies while the other segments are less 
involved, if at all. 
In early 2016 the Yale Team used the Segmentation methodology to identify how 
the Six Americas of Climate change view the issue of climate change when framed as a 
religious, moral or spiritual issue (Roser-Renouf et al., 2016). Using this methodology 
provided the Yale Team with specific insights into how the Six America individually 
differ on these frames.  They found, for example, that while the Alarmed weighed 
scientific evidence over religious beliefs when the two were in conflict, the majority of 
the other segments would side with religion.  This is valuable insight for climate change 
communicators to know that impassioned pleas from religious leaders, are more likely to 
motivate these segments than passionless charts and figures presented by scientists 
(Roser-Renouf et al., 2016). They similarly found that these segments differ in their 
egalitarian and individualistic values, which too provides clues for how to motivate 
specific groups in the population (Roser-Renouf et al., 2016). 
 
Canadian and Comparative Studies 
While much of the research on climate views is focussed on the United States, 
some studies have investigated Canadians’ views on climate change. For example, Boric, 
Lachapelle & Rabe (2011) compared the views of Canadians and Americans for their 
opinion on climate change across a number of variables such as whether it is happening, 
its causes, and the role of the government in addressing it.  They found some interesting 
differences between the two countries including that there is less skepticism about 
climate change in Canada than in the United States. Canadians were less likely to believe 
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that scientists are manipulating data and they found that Canadians are more willing to 
pay for climate mitigating measures such as cap and trade policies. Skepticism tended to 
be aligned to Conservative Party Affiliation in Canada, and Republican support in the US 
(Borick et al., 2011). 
 Such comparative studies are a useful tool as they help to discern broad patterns 
of behaviors across different societal and political landscapes (Borick et al., 2011). As 
each other’s largest trading partners, Canada and the United States are tightly dependant 
on each other’s policies related to climate change and mitigation (Lachapelle, Borick & 
Rabe, 2012). With Canada’s dependence on energy markets, Canadians may experience 
mixed emotions with wanting to curb emissions, while simultaneously financially 
benefiting from the production of energy. Canada is a large emitter of CO2 and its 
emissions have grown more rapidly than the United States in recent years, due primarily 
to activity in the Athabasca tar sands (Lachapelle et al., 2012). Thus finding ways to 
motivate the Canadian public to support greenhouse gas-reducing policies and to embrace 
more pro-environmental behaviors remains a formidable challenge. 
 
Research Questions and Significance 
To my knowledge no one has yet utilized the Six Americas Audience 
segmentation developed by the Yale Team (Maibach et. al., 2011a) to assess 
segmentation of climate change views in Canada. The research question this thesis will 
address is, utilizing the methodology of the Six Americas, are Canadians similarly 
segmented on climate change beliefs as Americans? Secondly, the usefulness of this 
segmentation will be tested by using the segment membership to predict the level of 
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support for various greenhouse gas reducing strategies. Third, demographic variables will 
be used as predictors of policy support and as comparators to the usefulness of audience 
segmentation. 
This framework could provide a useful comparison of views on climate change 
between these two large trading partners. It will also provide a baseline moving forward 
so that the views of these distinct groups of Canadians have on climate change and 
climate policy can be monitored over time. Having a comparator country will support 
future research to understand what factors contribute to stronger segmentation in either 
country, and thus how climate communication efforts can be tailored to specific groups.  
With Canada’s different political party framework this research will help identify how 
supporters of Canada’s multiple political parties view various climate policies. With 
Canada and the United states both being significant greenhouse gas emitters there are 
significant opportunities for effective harm reduction strategies.  Understanding how 
Canadians are segmented in their views on climate change could inform the development 
of climate communications that can be targeted to the beliefs and behaviors of each of 
these segments in Canada. Climate communicators can thus test the effectiveness of 
various strategies on each segment in an attempt to improve personal behaviors and 
increase support for institutional change. Haidt (2012) proclaims that theories are cheap, 
but only once they are empirically tested can we begin to understand why we may have 
such drastically different views on objective facts than our neighbours. 
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Chapter II 
Methods 
 
In order to characterize Canadians’ views on climate change I utilized the Six 
Americas segmentation tools provided by Maibach, Leiserowitz, Roser-Renouf, Mertz 
and Akerlof (2011b). These tools were made available by these investigators to support 
the implementation of this methodology in other jurisdictions, and to further the reach of 
the research. The methods are fully described by Maibach et al. (2011a) in a separate 
article. Audience segmentation methodology is widely supported in other fields where 
effective public engagement is required to shape behaviour, including political science 
and public health (Maibach et al., 2011a). 
 
Survey Design 
The investigators in the Six Americas study utilized a 36-question segmentation 
tool using a linear discriminant function that correctly identified 90.6% of the sample 
(Maibach et al., 2011a). The complete Six Americas survey is large and took an average 
of 50 minutes per respondent, which includes the 36 question audience segmentation, as 
well as the collection of policy preferences and demographic information. By eliminating 
21 of the least predictive variables from the audience segmentation questions, the 
investigators also developed a “reduced discriminant model” that correctly predicts 
83.8% of the sample (Maibach et al., 2011a). In order to mitigate scope and funding 
considerations for this research, I used the 15-question reduced discriminant model. 
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Some references in the 15 questions were specific to the United States. The 
questions were therefore modified to meet the Canadian context. For example, one 
question referenced the United States, its President and Congress.  That reference was 
changed to reflect the parliamentary system of government in Canada. I do not believe 
that the change in wording altered the meaning of the question significantly. The 
questions asked (along with the original Six Americas questions, when different) are 
shown in the Appendix.  
The complete survey in this study had 33 questions in total. The first 15 questions 
are the reduced discriminant model segmentation questions. The subsequent nine 
questions were designed to predict the usefulness of the segmentation, and again 
followed the wording and methodology in Maibach et al. (2011a). These nine questions 
measured policy preferences on initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  
Respondents were asked on a four-point scale whether they Strongly Agree (4), Agree 
(3), Disagree (2) or Strongly Disagree (1) with the proposed policy initiative. It is 
hypothesized that respondents will be less agreeable to such policies as they move along 
the continuum of segments from the Alarmed through to the Dismissive. The responses to 
these nine questions were averaged into a single index of policy support, named the GHG 
Policy Index.  Using this index as an outcome measure, regression models were created 
to test the predictive ability of the segmentation for GHG policy support, compared to 
other demographic variables. 
The final nine questions on the survey requested demographic information from 
the respondents. These questions included age, gender, province of residence, income, 
employment status, education level, ethnicity, political ideology and voting behavior in 
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the last Canadian federal election. These characteristics will shed some light on whether 
certain demographic variables are predictive of support for GHG reduction polices, and 
provide a comparison to the usefulness of the audience segmentation to explain variance 
in support for GHG policies. In the fall of 2015 Canada had a federal election where 
climate policy was a source of difference between the ruling Conservative Party and the 
major opposition parties. This created an opportunity to assess whether voting behavior 
in the last federal election was a predictor of support for GHG reduction policies. 
 
Ethical Research Guidelines 
To ensure this study met ethical research guidelines it was submitted to the 
Committee on the Use of Human Subjects at Harvard University. The target audience for 
this survey were adults in the Canadian population. No personally identifiable 
information was shared between the respondents and the researcher. Participation was 
voluntary and all participants provided their consent to continue in the survey. The 
Committee on the Use of Human Subjects determined that the nature of the study was no 
greater than minimal risk and that it met exemption status. 
 
Distribution and Participant Selection 
In order to get a representative sample of Canadians, the Leger Web Panel 
(Legerweb) was utilized to have a distribution channel capable of delivering a sufficient 
number of surveys across the country. Legerweb is the largest Canadian web panel with 
400,000 active and representative members across Canada (Leger, 2016). To determine 
an appropriate sample size for a representative sample of Canadians, an online population 
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calculator was used. With a population size of 35,851,000 (Statistics Canada, 2015a) a 
margin of error of 5% and a confidence level of 95%, the online Survey Monkey Sample 
Size Calculator (Survey Monkey, 2015) determined that 385 samples would be needed. 
Precisely the same result was found using Calculator.net (Calculator.net, 2015). 
The survey was distributed across Canada from February 11, 2016 to February 15, 
2016. Only respondents over the age of 18 who consented to the survey were allowed to 
participate. Respondents were given the option to skip any questions they preferred not to 
answer.  
The methodology described in Maibach et al. (2011a) requires that responses 
missing more than 20% missing data for the segmentation questions should be discarded. 
Thus although only 385 final samples were needed for a representative sample, a target of 
500 samples was utilized to ensure sufficient (>80%) completed surveys. A series of chi-
square tests were used to compare the age, gender and geographic region of the 
respondents to the predicted Canadian adult population values to validate that the survey 
was nationally representative. 
The first question in the survey (question zero) was a consent form, approved 
through the ethics review process. Respondents were asked to select that they voluntarily 
agreed to take part in the questionnaire by electing “Yes,” or that they did not want to 
continue by selecting “No”. Respondents who selected “No” were then excluded from 
continuing in the study. 
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Data Analysis 
The data collected through the Leger Panel was provided in SPSS format. The 
consent question prevented any non-consenting subjects from being included in the data 
set. Participants were given the option to not answer questions, which allowed for 
missing data. For consistency with the Six America’s study, the missing data for the first 
15 segmentation questions was replaced according to the rules set out by Maibach et al. 
(2011b). The missing data rules from that study are provided in the Appendix. That study 
primarily used mean substitution, which is prone to bias.  As noted and discussed in the 
Results chapter below, only a small number of samples were recoded this way. The same 
methodology was used for missing data in the GHG policy questions. 
The responses to the first fifteen questions on audience segmentation were 
analyzed in SPSS using the script and toolkit provided by Maibach et al. (2011b). This 
process grouped the respondents into the six segments of climate belief – the Alarmed, 
the Concerned, the Cautious, the Disengaged, the Doubtful and the Dismissive – the Six 
Canadas of Climate Change. 
An ANOVA was completed across the six segments for each of the 15 questions 
to test the difference in means for the profiling questions, and to test the null hypothesis 
that there is no difference between segments for each question. This was done to validate 
the power of the questions to solicit significantly different responses between the 
segments. 
To align with the Maibach et al. (2011a), and to ensure a basis for some 
comparisons, several regression models were created to test the predictive value of this 
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segmentation model, as well as to test other characteristics of the respondents. Using 
responses to the nine policy preference questions as an outcome measure (y), the 
regressions were then conducted utilizing SPSS. To achieve this, the mean responses 
were averaged for each policy question by segment. Then the responses were combined 
into a single (mean) “GHG Policy Index” for all of the questions. Cronbach’s Alpha was 
calculated to test the internal consistency of the scores.  Regression Model 1 evaluated 
demographic variables including age, gender, region, education level, income, 
employment status and race. A one-way ANOVA was first constructed for each of the 
demographic variables to test whether there was significant effect on the outcome.  Those 
that were significant were included in the regression, while the rest were excluded from 
further evaluation. Significant categorical demographic variables such as “region” were 
recoded into dummy variables in order to allow for the regression. Regression Model 2 
evaluated the effect of political ideology as a predictor of the GHG Policy Index. In this 
model political ideology was assumed to be on a continuum of strongly liberal to strongly 
conservative. Regression Model 3 similarly evaluated voting behavior in the last Federal 
election in 2015 as the independent variable. Again the categorical variables indicating 
the supported party had to be recoded into dummy variables to allow these variables into 
the regression. Regression Model 4 tested the segments (Alarmed, Concerned, Cautions, 
Disengaged, Doubtful or Dismissive) as a predictor of the GHG Policy Index.  Finally, 
Regression Model 5 was the full model of all the predictor variables. 
To test whether Canadians are similarly segmented in their views on climate 
change as Americans, a chi-square test was completed.  This test compared the observed 
number of Canadian respondents by segment, to the expected number of American 
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respondents for each segment based on the results of the latest Six Americas study 
(Roser-Ranouf, 2016). 
 
Assumptions for Linear Regressions 
To carry out the linear regressions several assumptions must be met. The survey 
questions, as well as the regression models, were designed to ensure that these 
assumptions were met. First, all variables were either designed to be continuous, or in the 
case of categorical variables, were coded into dummy variables to allow the regression. 
Second, partial regression plots were created to test the linearity between the variables. 
Third, scatterplots were used to visually identify whether there were significant outliers, 
and the Cook’s distance was also evaluated. Fourth, to ensure independence of 
observations the Durbin-Watson statistic was calculated. Fifth, the homoscedasticity was 
evaluated by plotting predicted against residual values. Finally, a P-P plot was created to 
test that the residuals of the regression line are approximately normally distributed.    
 
Research Limitations 
There are some potential research limitations that need to be highlighted. To 
mitigate funding challenges, the 15-question reduced discriminate model was used rather 
that the full 36 question linear discriminant function. Based on the research methodology 
by Maibach et al. (2011a), this model is expected to correctly identify respondents into 
the correct segments for 83.8% rather than 90.6% of the sample. Thus it should be noted 
that this may account for some variance in the comparisons between Canadians and 
Americans, given the 36-question full discriminant model survey was used for the latter. 
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Some slight differences in the selection of participants between the two studies such as 
how participants were selected could also account for some variation in the expected 
variation on how correctly the tool will identify respondents. Two questions were altered 
very slightly to accommodate the differences in government structure between the 
countries.  The changes were slight as noted above but should be acknowledged. The 
original questions from the Six Americas compared to the questions asked for the Six 
Canadas are shown in the Appendix. 
The Leger panel was used to assist with reaching a willing audience across 
Canada with a sufficient sample size. There is presumably a risk that repeated panel 
members who voluntarily participate in multiple studies, may respond differently than 
members of the general population. However, a very similar type of panel was used in the 
Six Americas segmentation. Such panels also have advantages such as being able to 
ensure a somewhat representative sample across demographic variables. There is a risk of 
bias in the population surveyed. To evaluate whether the sample group was nationally 
representative for Canadian adults by gender, age and region of residence chi-square tests 
were used. The sample group was characterized against the latest demographic 
information form national census data in terms of age, gender and region of residence. 
The data was then compared to the Six Americas data in the United States to identify 
similarities and differences that may stimulate future research. The meaningfulness of 
that data was then discussed in the context of framing future climate communications 
towards improving support for pro-environmental policies and behaviors.  
  
 29 
 
Chapter III 
Results 
 
A total of 553 responses were received from across Canada.  All cases that had 
more than 20% missing data (n=2) were excluded from the analysis. The remainder with 
any missing data had those data variables recoded, as described by Maibach et al. (2011b) 
and in the Methods. Missing data was minimal with 38 of 551 respondents missing 1 
(n=31), 2 (n=4) or 3 (n=3) of the 33 questions.   
The Legerweb panel had the ability to distribute surveys across Canada by 
location, age group and gender.  The relative proportions of responses by region in the 
survey were compared to those expected based on current population data.  A chi-square 
test to compare area of residence of the sample group against predicted Canadian 
population data shows there were no significant differences between the groups (p>0.975; 
Table 1). It was noted that no responses were received from Canada’s three territories – 
Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut, though combined the population in these 
areas is estimated at less than 0.4% of Canada’s population. A chi-square test also 
verified no significant differences between the sample and expected Canadian population 
based on age (p>0.95; Table 2) or gender (p>0.80; Table 3).   
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Table 1. Chi-square on relative Canadian population by region for observed sample 
population compared to the expected population. 
  Observed Expected   
Province/Territory % of Total 
Respond- 
ants 
2015 % 
Population* 
Expected 
Population Chi-square 
Alberta & Territories 
(YK, NT, NU) 
10.9 60 12.0 66 
0.57 
Atlantic  
(NB,NL,NS,PEI) 
6.9 38 6.6 36 
0.07 
British Columbia 13.2 73 13.1 72 0.01 
Ontario 38.9 214 38.5 212 0.02 
Prairie (MB,SK) 6.7 37 6.8 37 0.01 
Quebec 23.4 129 23.0 127 0.04 
Totals: 100 551 100 551 0.71 
At 5 degrees of freedom, p>0.975 
*Source (Statistics Canada, 2015b)  
 
 
 
Table 2. Chi-square on relative Canadian population by gender for observed sample 
population compared to the expected population. 
  Observed Sample Expected   
Gender % of Total 
Respond- 
ants 
2015 %  
Population 
(>18 years)* 
Expected 
Population Chi-square 
Female 48.8 269 49.2 271 0.02 
Male 51.2 282 50.8 280 0.02 
Totals: 100 551 100 551 0.03 
At 1 degree of freedom, p>0.95 
*Source (Statistics Canada, 2015a)  
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Table 3. Chi-square on relative Canadian population by age group for observed sample 
population compared to the expected population. 
  Observed Sample Expected   
Age Group % of Total 
Respond- 
ants 
2015 % 
Population* 
Expected 
Population Chi-square 
18-24 10.3 57 11.5 63 0.64 
25-34 16.2 89 17.2 95 0.35 
35-44 16.9 93 16.5 91 0.05 
45-54 19.8 109 18.0 99 0.97 
55-64 17.2 95 16.8 93 0.06 
65+ 19.6 108 20.0 110 0.04 
Totals: 100 551 100 551 2.12 
At 5 degrees of freedom, p>0.80 
*Source (Statistics Canada, 2015a) 
 
 
The segmentation script provided by Maibach et al. (2011b) was applied using SPSS 
and the “Six Canadas of Climate Change” were determined - The Alarmed (21%), The 
Concerned (40%), The Cautious (26%), The Disengaged (2%), The Doubtful (6%) and 
The Dismissive (5%) (Figure 1). 
An ANOVA across the six segments for each of the 15 questions tested the 
between-segment difference in means for each of the reduced discriminant tool audience 
segmentation questions (Table 4).  For each question, the between-segment differences 
were significant (p<0.001). The mean responses were calculated by segment for each of 
the 15 profiling questions (Table 5). 
The responses to the nine GHG policy preference questions (4= Strongly Support) 
were averaged for each segment (Table 6).  As in Maibach et al. (2011a) the policy 
questions were averaged into a single GHG Policy Index by segment to be used as the 
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outcome measure (y) for the regressions (bottom of Table 6).  The policy scale had a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.90.  
 
 
Figure 1. The Six Canadas of climate change –How Canadians are distributed in beliefs 
on climate change. 
  
Alarmed 
21% 
Concerned 
40% 
Cautious 
26% 
Disengage
d 
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Doubtful 
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5% 
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Table 4. ANOVA with difference in means between each reduced discriminant model 
audience segmentation question.  
 
*See Appendix 1 for detailed questions 
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Table 5. Mean responses to profiling questions by segment. 
Between segment means (p<0.001) 
Descriptions from Maibach et al. (2011a) 
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Table 6.  Mean responses to greenhouse gas reduction policy questions by segment. 
 
Descriptions from Maibach et al. (2011a) 
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Regression Assumptions 
Before completing the regressions, the data were examined to ensure they met the 
necessary assumptions for a linear model. First, the data variables had to be measured at a 
continuous level. The survey questions were designed to ensure that the data were 
continuous. The dependent (y) variable, the GHG Policy Index, was the mean of 
responses by segment from a 4-point continuous scale (Table 6).  The independent (x) 
variables were either continuous on a sliding scale or categorical.  When categorical 
variables were used, such as province or political party, they were recoded to dummy-
variables to allow for the regression. 
 Second, partial regression plots were created between each of the independent 
variables (x) and the GHG Policy Index (y) and examined for linearity. The scatterplots 
for each of the independent variables were produced for Gender and Education (Figure 
2), Province/Region (Figure 3), Political party an Political Ideology (Figure 4), and 
Audience Segment (Figure 5). A visual inspection confirms that the relationship between 
the independent variables and the GHG Policy Index appear linear. (Note that in the 
figures “PREF_Index” is the name of the GHG Policy Index.) 
Third, to ensure that there were no significant outliers, scatterplots were created of 
the GHG Policy Index compared to the predicted regression using SPSS and visually 
inspected. A visual inspection revealed no significant outliers (Figure 6). 
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Figure 2. Partial regression plots for gender and education level against GHG Policy 
Index. 
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Figure 3. Partial regression plots for province and/or region against GHG Policy Index.  
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Figure 4. Partial regression plots for political party voted for and political ideology level 
against GHG Policy Index. 
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Figure 5. Partial regression plots for political ideology level as well as audience 
segmentation against GHG Policy Index. 
 
 
  
Figure 6. Scatterplots of GHG Policy Index against regression standardized. 
 
Fourth, to ensure independence of observations and that the variables are not 
dependent on one-another, SPSS was used to calculate the Durbin-Watson statistic which 
was 1.996. Fifth, to test for homoscedasticity, the plot of residual against the expected 
was examined, and indicated that the error appears evenly distributed around the mean 
(Figure 7). Finally, to ensure that the residuals of the regression are normally distributed a 
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P-P plot was created using SPSS (Figure 8). From this plot it is apparent that the residual 
values are normally distributed around the predicted line.  
 
 
Figure 7. Scatterplot of GHG Policy Index against the standardized residual. 
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Figure 8. P-P Plot to test that residual errors are normally distributed. 
 
Regression Model Results 
Model 1 tested demographic characteristics of the respondents as predictors. An 
ANOVA for these variables showed that gender (p<0.01), region (p<0.001) and 
education-level (p<0.01) were significant predictors of the GHG Policy Index (Table 7). 
The remaining variables of age (p=0.072), annual income (p=0.313), employment status 
(p=0.246) and race (p=0.221) were not significant predictors and thus excluded from 
further analysis. All five regression models were calculated (Table 8). To further 
understand the impact of including the omitted demographic variables in the constant of 
Model l, regressions for the two dummy coded variables, Voting Behavior (Table 9) and 
Region (Table 10) were run independently as well. 
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Segmentation between Canada and the United States 
To test the hypothesis that Canadians are similarly segmented in their views on 
climate change as Americans, a chi-square was used to test the segmentation against the 
latest Six Americas study with data collected in 2015 (Roser-Ranouf, 2016).  The 
difference in segmentations is significant (p<0.001) and thus we reject the null hypothesis 
that they are similar (Table 11). 
 
Table 7. ANOVA for demographic variables. 
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Table 8. Regression models for demographics, political ideology, voting behavior and 
audience segmentation as predictors of support for greenhouse gas reduction policies. 
Table format adapted from Maibach et al. (2011a) 
 
Table 9. Linear Regression showing voting behavior in last Canadian federal election as 
predictor of GHG Policy Index.  
Voting Behavior B Significance 
Constant* 2.268 0.01 
Liberal 0.61 0.01 
NDP 0.70 0.01 
Green Party 0.80 0.01 
Other/Did not Vote 0.41 0.01 
Adjusted R2 0.048   
F 5.441   
N 551   
 *Conservative is the omitted variable in the constant 
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Table 10. Linear Regression showing region of residence as predictor of GHG Policy 
Index. 
Region B Significance 
Constant* 2.44 0.01 
British Columbia 0.43 0.01 
Prairies 0.19 0.19 
Atlantic 0.40 0.01 
Ontario  0.22 0.02 
Quebec 0.47 0.01 
Adjusted R2 0.048 
 F 5.441 
 N 551   
*Alberta is the omitted variable in the constant 
 
Table 11. Chi-square test between climate change segments in Canada and the United 
States. 
At 5 degrees of freedom, p<0.001 
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Chapter IV 
Discussion 
 
The primary question addressed by this research is whether Canadians are 
similarly segmented in their views on climate change as Americans. To answer this, an 
audience segmentation tool developed by Maibach et al. (2011a) was applied to survey 
data collected from a nationally representative sample of Canadian adults. This research 
set out to test the usefulness of this audience segmentation tool to identify distinct groups 
of Canadians who vary based on their beliefs in climate change, whether it is human-
caused, and what they are willing to do to slow its progress, or to mitigate its effects. To 
test the predictive utility of the segmentation, this segmentation variable was used as a 
predictor of an index measuring support for greenhouse gas reduction policies (GHG 
Policy Index). As a basis of comparison, other demographic and behavioral attributes of 
the respondents were also used as predictors for the GHG Policy Index.   
 
The Use of Audience Segmentation 
This segmentation tool has been applied in the United States on multiple 
occasions (see Roser-Renouf et al., 2016 for latest) to identify the Six Americas of 
Climate Change. Variations have also been applied in Australia (Morrison, Duncan, 
Sherley & Parkon, 2013), India (Leiserowitz, Thaker, Feinberg & Cooper (2013), and 
Germany (Metag, Fuchsslin & Schafer, 2015) but to this researcher’s knowledge this has 
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never been tested in Canada. A survey was sent to a nationally representative sample of 
Canadians based on age, gender and region of residence.  
The purpose of audience segmentation is to identify distinct groups of people to 
whom we can target meaningful and actionable climate communications. This 
methodology is not unique to climate communications and has been used in multiple 
other fields.  Public health, for example, has recognized that people will respond uniquely 
to different messages or motivators whether consequences, or social norms (Hornik, 
2002). As Hornik (2002) points out we would be naïve to believe that people from one 
group would respond effectively to messages targeted at another. Similarly, political 
strategists have utilized audience segments to identify and focus on potential swing 
voters, while ignoring known supporters and ideological opponents whom they cannot 
turn (Sosnik, Fournier & Dowd, 2007). More recently, online and social media 
companies are using segmentation to target specific ads or content based on users’ 
previous history and their online profiles (Hine et al., 2014). 
With limited resources, climate communicators can ill afford to risk failure with 
costly attempts on blanketed climate communication strategies (Moser, 2014). Public 
engagement for scientists and policy makers aimed at reducing climate-harming 
behaviors poses challenges, particularly when there is a mismatch between the message 
and the audience (Hine et al., 2014). This mismatch can further undermine the message 
when it fails to resonate with or align with the values of audience (Moser, 2010). 
Audience segmentation provides policy makers and communicators with empirical 
information to help it advance its objectives through targeted engagement (Hine et al., 
2014). 
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The Yale Team set out to create a segmentation tool that could be applied to 
independent population samples to identify “groups of people within a larger population 
who are homogenous with regard to critical attributes …. (beliefs, behaviors, political 
ideology) that are most relevant to a public education campaign” (Maibach et al. (2011a, 
p. 1). They provided a script to run in SPSS along with the specific segmentation 
questions and their coding (Miabach et al., 2011b). As described in the Results chapter 
the reduced discriminant tool was used in this research to mitigate scope and funding 
concerns for this study. 
 
Survey Results 
In February of 2016 the Six Canadas of Climate change were identified as the 
Alarmed (21%), the Concerned (40%), the Cautious (26%), the Disengaged (2%), the 
Doubtful (6%) and the Dismissive (5%) (Figure 1). Viewing the segments as a 
continuum, 87% of Canadians are thus Alarmed, Concerned or Cautious with respect to 
climate change, while only 13% are Disengaged, Doubtful or Dismissive. Given the 
potentially disastrous impacts of climate change this is perhaps a comforting finding, and 
yet Canada remains one of the highest emitters of GHGs per capita in the world (Pachauri 
et al., 2014) and the ninth highest emitter overall when it comes to fossil fuels (Olivier, et 
al., 2014). Thus, Canadians’ beliefs on climate change do not necessarily inform their 
behaviors. 
A series of chi-square tests validated that the survey was distributed to a 
nationally representative sample of Canadian adults by age group, region and gender 
(Tables 1-3). For each of these variables, the observed values were not significantly 
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different from the predicted values, and so we accept the null hypothesis that the samples 
are the same.  
An ANOVA across the six segments tested the difference in means between 
segments for each of the segmentation questions and found them to be significant 
(p<0.001; Table 4). With the high F-values it is unlikely we could accept the null 
hypothesis across the actual distribution for any of the questions. In other words, the 
questions had significant predictive value in grouping individuals into the segments. 
 
Motivations, Behaviors and Preferred Societal Responses 
The between-segment variation on the segmentation questions is both significant 
(p<0.001) and telling of the characteristics of the Six Canadas. The certainty of global 
warming varies widely from 8.63 (scale=9) for the Alarmed, to 3.38 for the Dismissive 
(Table 5).  Meanwhile the percent that agree that changes in climate owe primarily to 
human activities ranges from 91.4% for the Alarmed to 7.7% for the Dismissive. 
Likewise, previous worry about global warming, timing of potential harm to Canadians, 
and to future generations, and the personal importance of the issue follow a predictable 
downward pattern from the Alarmed to the Dismissive.  
When asked how much prior thought they had given to global warming, those 
who were on the two poles of the segmentations, the Alarmed and the Dismissive, scored 
the highest. This finding was similar when they were asked how many of their friends 
shared their views on climate change. This raises the question of how much we live in an 
echo chamber, and surround ourselves with those who share our concerns and views. 
Some scholars have used “echo chambers” as a notion of how the information we value 
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has become a partisan choice, and how that information is used to reinforce rather than 
challenge our views (Jasny, Waggle & Fisher, 2015). In a world of connectedness 
through social networks and social media, it would be interesting in future research to 
understand how the sources of information we choose to receive, and that which we 
ignore, informs or validates our world-view.   
Interestingly the responses to “how willing we are to change our opinion” were 
also very polarized, with the Alarmed and Dismissive most unwilling, while the other 
four segments were less steadfast in their views (Table 5). It is these more centrist 
segments that would therefore likely present communicators and policy-makers with the 
most receptive audience. They also arguably pose the greatest risk for being swayed by 
science-denying policy makers. While the Dismissive may be the most resistant audience, 
in Canada they make up only 5% of the population. Unfortunately, they may also be the 
most vocal and thus cannot simply be ignored. 
When asked whether people should themselves do more or less to address global 
warming, the respondents followed the predictable pattern with the alarmed being the 
most agreeable. Interestingly however, when asked how often they punish companies for 
non-sustainable practices, most of the respondents had taken minimal action. The 
Alarmed took the most action saying they on average punished companies “a few times 
(2-3)” annually.  However, there was little variance between the other segments with how 
often they punished corporations, even between the Concerned and the Dismissive. This 
raises a paradox where people say they should be doing more, while their behaviors do 
not reflect that. This finding is more a reflection of personal than corporate behavior, and 
validates the observation made earlier, that beliefs may not always inform behaviors, 
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even amongst the more concerned segments. With respect to the desired government 
action, a majority in all segments, other than Disengaged and the Dismissive, felt that 
climate change should be a priority for federal and provincial governments, and that this 
is not contingent on actions taken by other nations. This is a reassuring finding for 
policymakers wishing to enact climate mitigating strategies.  
 
GHG Policy Index 
After the audience segmentation questions, respondents were asked a series of 
nine ordinal questions that asked them to rank their level of support for various 
greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction policies from “Strongly Support” (4) to “Strongly 
Oppose” (1). The responses to these questions were then averaged for each segment to 
create a single “GHG Policy Index.” The Cronbach’s alpha for the policy questions was 
0.90 suggesting a high internal consistency between the scores in the index. This 
compares favorably to the results of the earlier American study which had a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.86 (Maibach et al., 2011a). The GHG Policy Index was then used as an 
outcome measure (y) for a series of regressions to assess the predictive utility of the 
segmentation (Maibach et al., 2011a). The hypothesis is that segment membership should 
predict level of support for climate policy as measured by the GHG Policy Index. Table 6 
shows the willingness of respondents to accept these policies by segment.  
The observed GHG Policy Index decreases as expected as respondents move 
between segments from the Alarmed to the Dismissive. One anomaly is noted in the 
index score for the Disengaged (N=12; index=2.70) which is unexpectedly slightly higher 
than that for the Cautious (index=2.44). Regression Model 4 (Table 8) demonstrates that 
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there is indeed a significant linear relationship between the six segments and the GHG 
Policy Index, and this is thus explained as sampling error.   
There are, however, some interesting observations from this data on GHG policy 
support (Table 6). The Disengaged seem particularly supportive of GHG policies that 
involve government action such as subsidising efficient appliances in the home (question 
17), adopting a carbon tax (18), require more renewable energy production (19), 
regulating fuel efficiency with automakers (23), and tax rebates for energy efficient 
vehicles (24). As Maibach et al. (2011a) noted when they ran the full discriminant model 
in the United States, the Disengaged were the most willing to change their minds about 
climate change. These individuals, although Disengaged, potentially represent a receptive 
audience for pro-environmental communications and policy.   
 
Regression Model Development 
A series of regression models were constructed to test the predictive utility of the 
audience segmentation method. Additional tests and models were created to also test 
other audience characteristics, namely their demographic information including age, 
gender, area of residence, household income, employment status and race, as well as 
political ideology and voting behavior in the last Canadian federal election. These 
additional models had the purpose of testing whether groups within these variables (e.g. 
male vs. female) were predictive of GHG mitigating policy support. They also served as a 
comparator to the Six Canadas audience segmentation to assess how well this 
segmentation explains the variation in policy support (R2) compared to the measured 
demographics.  
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Demographic Findings 
 As many of the demographic variables were categorical, each was first tested with 
an ANOVA to determine whether there were significant differences between the means 
for these variables (Table 7). With the GHG Policy Index as the dependant variable, age 
(p>0.07), income (p>0.31) and race (p>0.22) had no significant difference in means for 
level of support for these policies in Canada. We thus accept the null hypothesis for these 
demographics and excluded them from further analysis. This was consistent with the 
results found by Maibach et al. (2011a) in the United States. In regression Model 1 where 
the remaining demographic variables of gender, region and education were combined, 
these demographic variables together (R2=0.083) accounted for a little over 8% of the 
variance in the GHG Policy Index.   
 In Model 1, gender was a significant predictor of the GHG Policy Index.  
Specifically being female was significantly predictive (B=0.166; p<0.01) of increased 
support. The reason for this difference was not tested in this study, but it raises questions 
for future research. Are there specific values more commonly held by females that 
motivate support for positive climate initiatives? This does perhaps suggest that climate 
science communicators may benefit from targeting pro-environmental campaigns at 
certain Canadian men. 
The results show that the region of residence for Canadians is a significant 
predictor of the GHG Policy Index. Although Canada has ten provinces and three 
territories, the populations between them differ vastly, with two of the provinces, Quebec 
(23.0%) and Ontario (38.5%), having over 50% of the population (Table 1). The four 
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sparsely populated eastern provinces (New Brunswick, Newfoundland & Labrador, Nova 
Scotia and Prince Edward Island) were grouped into a single “Atlantic” region, as were 
the two “Prairie” provinces (Saskatchewan & Manitoba). To conduct a regression on 
these categorical variables they were dummy-coded, with one group omitted to avoid 
issues of multicollinearity. Alberta was arbitrarily chosen as the reference group and it 
was thus reflected in the constant (B0=2.00). Living in Quebec (B=0.450; p<0.001), 
British Columbia (B=0.427; p<0.001), the Atlantic Provinces (B=0.423; p<0.01) or 
Ontario (B=0.229; p<0.02) were all predictive of greater support for the GHG Policy 
Index over Alberta (Table 7).  Living in the Prairie Provinces (p>0.10) was not 
significantly different from Alberta for the GHG Policy Index. This was true in the 
mixed-demographic Model 1 (where voting Conservative was also included in the 
constant), and also held when region alone was tested as a predictor of the GHG Policy 
Index (Table 10). This is perhaps not surprising given that Alberta is home to, and 
economically reliant on the Athabasca Tar Sands, and the Prairie provinces too rely on 
the fossil fuel industry for much of their economies. Testing this link, between fossil fuel 
driven economies and support for the GHG Policy Index, would be a potential topic for 
future research. It is interesting to note that the difference between Alberta and seven of 
the other Provinces is significant with respect to the GHG Policy Index, providing 
additional clues to where communication efforts could be focussed. 
There were no respondents from Canada’s three territories, Nunavut, Yukon and 
the Northwest Territories. Although these are the most sparsely populated areas in the 
country with less than 0.4% of the population (Statistics Canada, 2015b), they encompass 
a large northern landmass featuring permafrost and ice sheets. This area is largely 
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populated by indigenous peoples who rely on climate to ensure the migration of animals 
for hunting. The people in this area may potentially be highly impacted by anthropogenic 
climate change, and would thus be an interesting population to segment in a future study 
on views on climate change. The Maibach et al. (2011a) study did not report geographic 
area of respondents and thus there is currently no comparator to the Six Americas. 
Education was the third demographic tested to be positively correlated with 
support for climate mitigating policies (B=0.091; p<0.001). Canadians with progressively 
more education were more like to support the policies. Thus developing strategies for 
focussing pro-environmental campaigns at less-educated voters could potentially be 
effective in increasing public support for GHG reduction policies. Note that the 
significance of education was not lost in the full model (Model 5; p<0.01) through 
interaction effects with the other variables, as it was in the Six Americas by Maibach et 
al. (2011a).  
Past research has found that level of scientific knowledge and technical reasoning 
capacity are not predictive of climate change belief (Kahan et al., 2012), and education 
alone may not be enough to motivate pro-environmental behaviors (Corner & Groves, 
2014). This study validates the findings of Hornsey et al. (2016) that education is 
positively correlated with belief in ACC. More research is needed to tease out why 
scientific knowledge and reasoning fail to predict climate change belief, while education 
level does. As a research question, perhaps there are aspects non-science fields of 
education such as arts, social science, or liberal arts that motivate support for positive 
climate policy.   
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Race, employment status and income were not significant predictors of policy 
support. This was the same finding in the American study (Maibach et al., 2011a). For 
this reason, these variables were removed from further analysis.   
 
Political Ideology 
Regression Model 2 compared a scale of political ideology from very right-wing 
conservative (1) to very left wing liberal (5) and was significant with respect to support 
for GHG Policy Index (p<0.001). Given prior research on the subject it is perhaps not 
surprising that support for GHG reduction policies decreases (B= - 0.256) as individuals 
move further to the right on the spectrum towards conservative values. In this study this 
regression model accounted for a little over 15% of the variance in policy support 
(R2=0.153). It might also partly explain the regional differences in support, for example 
in Alberta where until 2015 the Alberta Conservative party of Alberta held a majority 
Provincial government for 44 continuous years. This finding aligns with the Six 
Americas study which found that this political ideology variable accounted for 12% of 
the variance in policy preferences (Maibach et al., 2011a). This also supports the findings 
of Hornsey et al. (2016) who found that political ideology was the largest demographic 
correlate for climate change belief. 
 
Voting Behaviour in Last Federal Election 
 Regression Model 3 tested whether voting behavior in the 2015 Canadian federal 
election is predictive of the GHG Policy Index. Although the initial Six Americas study 
did not ask respondents about voting behavior, Canada’s recent Federal election provided 
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an opportunity to assess whether voting behavior was predictive of the GHG Policy 
Index. An ANOVA showed significant differences (p<0.001; Table 7) between various 
party supporters on their willingness to support GHG mitigating policies. To conduct a 
regression, dummy-variables were therefore created for the categorical independent 
variables of political parties, with “Conservative Party of Canada” arbitrarily selected as 
the omitted comparator variable. Note that none of the respondents indicated support for 
the Bloc Quebecois which is a Quebec-based separatist party that received only 4.4% of 
the popular vote during the election (CBC, 2015). The regression showed that voters of 
the Liberal Party (B=0.609), the New Democratic Party (B=0.702), The Green Party 
(B=0.801) and those who selected “Other/Did not vote” were all significantly (p<0.001) 
more supportive on the GHG Policy Index compared to Conservative Party of Canada. 
This held when voting behavior was assessed as part of Model 1, with other demographic 
variables, and also when it was assessed on its own as a predictor of GHG Policy support 
(Table 9). 
 Canada’s former Conservative Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, was widely 
known for his inaction on climate and his promotion of Canada’s oil sands. When he first 
took power in 2006 he took significant steps to reduce commitments on CO2 and GHGs 
and to ensure that Canada would not ratify the Kyoto Accord (Gutstein, 2014). Prime 
Minister Harper viewed environmental policies a threat to the economic security of 
Canada, while openly marketing Alberta’s oil sands as “ethical oil” (Gutstein, 2014).  
With the federal election of 2015, the new Liberal government has committed to 
improving Canada’s record on the environment (Mildenberger et al., 2016). The results 
of this survey (not to mention the federal election) are telling that the anti-environmental 
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approach of the former government may not have resonated well with voters. Table 12 
below shows how survey respondents voted in the last federal election according to their 
audience segment. Note that of the 62 respondents who were segmented as Doubtful or 
dismissive 36 (58%) were Conservative party voters. Of the 334 Alarmed and Concerned, 
the Conservatives made up only 12.6% (42) of the voters whereas the Liberals had 33% 
(111) and the New Democratic Party (NDP) had 22% (73). 
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Table 12. Number of votes received by each political party in 2015 Canadian Federal 
election by audience segment. 
 
 
Audience Segmentation 
Compared to demographics, political ideology, and voting behavior, membership 
in audience segment was the most effective predictor of the GHG Policy Index. Along 
the continuum of the index (Strongly Support =4; Strongly Oppose =1) respondents 
follow a predictable path of decreasing support from the Alarmed (GHG Policy Index 
=3.35) to the Dismissive (GHG Policy Index=1.59) (Table 6). Regression Model 4 tested 
the strength of this relationship with the GHG Policy Index again as the outcome measure 
and segment membership as the independent variable. The results showed that 
segmentation significantly predicts the GHG Policy Index (p<0.001; Table 7). 
Furthermore, segment membership accounts for 41% of the variation (adjusted R2=0.41) 
in the policy index (Table 8). Interestingly this is the identical result obtained by Maibach 
et al. (2011a) when they developed this model and tested its utility in this way. Audience 
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segmentation therefore explains significantly more of the variation in the GHG policy 
index than demographics (adjusted R2=0.083), political ideology (adjusted R2=0.151) or 
voting behavior in the last federal election (adjusted R2=0.141). 
 
The Full Model  
 Regression Model 5 was the full model, testing all of the predictor variables in the 
first four models. This model predicts a little over 45% the variance in the GHG Policy 
Index (R2=0.459).  In this model, education (p<0.01), political ideology (p<0.001) and 
segmentation (p<0.001) were still highly significant predictors of the GHG Policy Index 
in the Six Canadas of climate change, while gender and area of residence were no longer 
significant predictors. This differs slightly from the Six Americas where none of the 
demographic variable remained significant predictors in the full regression model. In the 
Canadian model gender, area of residence and even voting behavior were no longer 
significant with the interaction of all of these variables together. This could be due to an 
interaction or moderation effect with other variables.  Note that level of education 
remained significant even in the full model. 
 
Comparison to the Six Americas 
This research set out to test whether Canadians are similarly segmented in their 
views on climate change as Americans. The latest Six Americas Segmentation was 
released in early 2016 and summarizes data collected in the spring of 2015 (Roser-
Renouf et al., 2016). The latest Six Americas of Climate Change are the Alarmed (12%), 
the Concerned (29%), the Cautious (26%), the Disengaged (7%), the Doubtful (15%) and 
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the Dismissive (11%). A chi- square analysis (Table 11) was used to test the Six Canadas 
to the expected proportion of the Six Americas. The difference in segments across the 
countries was significantly different (p<0.001), and thus we reject the null hypothesis that 
the countries are similarly segmented in their views on climate change. From Table 11 
we can see that Canadians are better represented in the Alarmed and Concerned 
segments, while Americans populated the Disengaged, Doubtful and Dismissive 
segments more than the Canadians. The two countries had an identical proportion of the 
Cautious. 
Given the similarities between Canada and the United states, who are each other’s 
largest trading partners and closest neighbors, this is an interesting result. It is also 
interesting to note that the two countries had the same statistically significant 
demographic predictors of the GHG Policy Index, namely gender, education and political 
ideology. The American study did not report regional statistics (state or region of 
residence), which were significant in Canada. In neither country were age, income, 
employment status or race, predictors of the GHG Policy Index.   
In the Six Americas gender and education were not significant when assessed 
simultaneously with other predictors in the full regression model. In Canada however, 
education level remained a significant predictor in the full model (regression Model 5) 
with a small but notable Beta coefficient (B=0.05; p<0.01). Whether level of education, 
or the content delivered varies between the two countries would be an interesting focus 
for future research. The descriptive statistics of Canadian’s education level by segment 
are shown in Table 11. The same descriptive statistics were not provided in the Six 
Americas literature. 
 62 
 
Table 13. Education level of Canadians by audience segment. 
 
 
A recent study of teachers in the United States may shed some light on this from 
one side of the border.  Plutzer et al. (2016) found that there is significant confusion 
amongst science teachers in the United States regarding the existence and etiology of 
climate change. This study, which surveyed 1500 teachers in 50 states, found significant 
variation in the teaching on the level of scientific consensus. They found that the 
variation in teaching came from 1) overt pressure to not teach climate science, 2) lack of 
knowledge over a wide range of evidence; and 3) lack of clarity on the scientific 
consensus, where only 30% of middle school and 45% of high school teachers correctly 
identified the true level of consensus (Plutzer et al., 2016). Most interestingly, they found 
that teachers’ political ideology was a greater predictor of their approach to teaching 
climate change than their knowledge (Plutzer et al., 2016.). 
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Gender was significant in both countries with females being significantly more 
likely to support GHG mitigating policies than males. This significance was diminished 
in both countries when gender was included as part of the full regression models.  
Political ideology was significant in both countries when measured as a single predictor 
of the GHG policy index, and also in the full regression model. As a single predictor, 
ideology had moderate explanatory power for the variance in the GHG Policy Index in 
Canada (15%; Table 7) and in the United States (12%; Maibach et al., 2011a).   
Given that both countries share gender, education-level and political ideology as 
significant predictors of the GHG Policy Index, it raises the question why the 
segmentations are significantly different. Are there more conservatives in the Untied 
States? Are education levels or programming significantly different? Are there 
differences in the individualistic or egalitarian values between these two countries? 
Having this cross-border comparison now provides a framework for future research to 
explain the significant differences in climate change belief across the Canada – United 
States border.  
 
The Segmentation Tool 
In developing the segmentation tool Maibach et al. (2011a) used a latent class 
analysis (LCA) modeling technique to identify distinct latent classes, or segments. In this 
process they evaluated models that had five, six and seven segments, but settled on six 
based on this model’s fit and interpretability (Maibach et al., 2011a).  The intention of 
these researchers was to develop “a survey-based identification tool that can be used to 
identify audience segments in independent population samples with acceptable levels of 
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accuracy” (Miabach et al., 2011a, p. 2). Over 306 variables were tested in order to 
develop the 36 question “full discriminant model” that allows for independent sampling 
of populations to determine audience segmentation. The 15 question “reduced 
discriminant model” which was used here also allows this sampling by eliminating the 21 
least predictive variables. It was not within the scope of this research to assess the 
validity of the previous researcher’s Latent Class Analysis or selection of six segments. 
Some researchers have cautioned that a segmentation tool such as the one 
developed by Maibach et al. (2011a) has limitations. Hine et al. (2014) for example argue 
that such an approach implicitly assumes that individuals can move between segments 
over time, but that the segments themselves never change. This objection has some merit 
and is discussed further below under Future Research.  Perhaps a bigger objection is the 
lack of research that tracks how effectively segmentations have been used in climate 
communications to specifically target problem behaviors, and how effective those are 
compared to other modalities of public engagement (Hine et al., 2014). This is not 
necessarily as much of an objection to the segmentation methodology, as it is an 
opportunity to take this research forward. Hine et al. (2014) are correct to be concerned 
about the lack of research linking segments to effective campaigns. This is where 
segmentation studies will need to focus their efforts, and that is discussed more below.   
The predictive utility of this segmentation tool was demonstrated in this study. A 
regression found the segmentation to be the most powerful predictor of the variance in 
support for the GHG Policy Index (Table 8; R2=0.41). It was significantly more powerful 
than any demographics, political ideology or voting behavior alone. There are 
undoubtedly improvements that can be made to the segmentation tool, and by continuous 
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application of the scientific method we can monitor its effectiveness and value over time.  
In this type of social science research it should be noted that the tool need not have 
extreme precision to guide communicators and policy makers in developing interventions 
to change behaviors within certain segments of the population. Segmentation allows for 
more targeted interventions than a blanket “carpet-bomb” approach that can be 
empirically tested, despite inevitable variations within a group. 
 
Recent Research 
The most recent research utilizing the Six Americas methodology was released in 
February of 2016 (Roser-Renouf et al., 2016). In this study the investigators explored the 
link between faith, morality and the environment amongst the Six Americas. They 
hypothesized that reframing climate change as a moral and religious issue, rather than a 
scientific one, may resonate more with Americans who are amongst the most religious 
citizens in the industrialized world (Roser-Renouf et al., 2016). Their findings suggest 
that a moral framing of the issue would resonate more powerfully with unconcerned 
segments than would scientists with figures and data. Roser-Renouf et al. (2016) noted 
that a majority within all segments other than the Alarmed would weigh religious 
information over scientific information of the two were ever in conflict. Thus in the 
United States where a sizable portion of the population has doubts about climate change, 
framing climate policy within a religious or moral framework may help with moving 
people to more climate-supporting segments.   
While audience segmentation is in its relative infancy with respect to climate 
communications, this type of study demonstrates the power of this methodology. The 
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segmentation in this report provides some key insights into the values of these segments 
such as which groups are more egalitarian or individualistic. Using this information, 
researchers can begin to test communication strategies on these segments and then 
measure the effects of their interventions. Linking the effects of reducing GHGs to 
helping reduce drought in developing nations may for example motivate segments that 
have egalitarian values.  Showing the potential economic benefits of green energy may 
motivate segments with individualistic values. The segmentation itself is a useful tool, 
but perhaps the most pressing area of research is how to use it to move people between 
the segments to more pro-environmental behaviors. 
 
Climate Opinion in Canada 
Interestingly on February 15, 2016, the day the Six Canadas survey closed, 
another team released findings on climate change public opinion in Canada by region 
(Mildenberger et al., 2016). While they found that a full 79% of Canadians believe that 
the climate is changing, only 44% believe it is caused mostly by human activities.  Given 
the different framing of their questions, a direct comparison of these values to the Six 
Canadas study is challenging.  Perhaps the most interesting finding is the diversity of 
opinion on climate change at local levels. They found the strongest support for climate 
change is in coastal areas and urban areas, whereas it is the lowest in rural areas.  Of the 
ten federal electoral districts with the lowest belief in climate change, seven were in 
Alberta, and the other three were in Saskatchewan (2) and Manitoba (1) (Mildenberger et 
al., 2016).  This aligns with the findings of the Six Canadas study which found Alberta 
and the Prairie Provinces to have the lowest support for GHG reduction policies.   
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Like this current Six Canadas study, Mildenberger et al. (2016) found Canadians 
believe that climate change is happening at higher levels than Americans do.  They also 
found that Canadians have widespread support for climate mitigating policies with 
emissions trading the most highly supported, with majority support in every single 
Canadian electoral district. On the other hand, Canadians are more divided over carbon 
taxation which is consistent with this current study.   
 
Future Research 
This study applied a segmentation tool to a representative sample of the Canadian 
population to categorize individuals into distinct segments based on their views on 
anthropogenic climate change.  The study further went on to test and validate the 
predictive utility of this tool in accounting for support of a GHG Policy Index and 
determined that segment membership was a significant predictor of policy support.  
Having this knowledge builds on similar studies conducted in the United States, 
Australia, Germany and India and supports future comparisons between these countries.  
This research provides a framework to support future studies in Canada to help climate 
communicators better understand their audience in crafting effective interventions to 
promote more pro-environmental behaviors. Future research in this area should include 
ongoing segmentation analysis as well as measuring the effectiveness of tailored 
communications for each segment, or even for members within segments.  Most 
importantly such research needs to not only focus on changing beliefs, but more 
importantly modifying behaviors.   
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Ongoing Segmentation Analysis 
This research provides a baseline for the segmentation of Canadian’s view on climate 
change. Repeating this study periodically will enable us to monitor Canadians’ beliefs 
and behaviors around climate change over time, and whether Canadians are moving 
between segments. This could serve as a pulse-check on Canadian’s views and provide 
policy makers and communicators with intelligence for crafting policy and strategies. 
There are objections to this type of research as noted above, namely that it assumes that 
movement only happens between segments and that the segments themselves remain 
static (Hine et al., 2014). This is a valid objection that warrants vigilance an monitoring. 
But this does not take away the value of using this as a tool for monitoring views over 
time, and for targeting interventions at specific segments. As noted these segmentations 
do not necessarily demand scientific precision to be effective tools for designing and 
measuring interventions. Empirical data and information from these studies will inform 
the value of pursuing these methods over time. 
Although segmentation has been used in other research areas, such as marketing and 
health for years, segmentation for climate communications is still in its relative infancy. 
The results in this study have demonstrated the effectiveness of this reduced discriminant 
segmentation tool in identifying unique groups of individuals in a population with respect 
to their beliefs, motivations and behaviors around climate change. It has demonstrated 
with significance that these groupings accurately predict in a linear fashion, support for 
the GHG Policy Index. Having this segmentation and utilizing it concurrently across 
borders enables us to test theories that account for differences between these countries.  
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We have seen for example that education and political ideology were significant 
predictors of the GHG policy index in both Canada and the United States, but that are our 
segments are statistically different.  Armed with this information we can now begin to 
design experiments to evaluate the institutional differences in our educational and 
political systems to determine if they will reveal actionable knowledge to improve 
environmental behaviors. 
 
Tailoring Climate Communications  
There is seemingly limited research on how specific audience segments respond 
various types of climate communications. Haidt (2012) has found that appeals to reason 
may have a boomerang effect even when empirical facts run counter to the inherent moral 
values of individuals.  Climate communications must therefore be well conceived if their 
intent is to positively modify behaviors. Hine et al. (2013) similarly found that 
individuals in various segments responded more favorably to messaging that is framed to 
align with their values. They found for example that those who were undecided on 
climate change were more receptive to messages that are emotional or that focus on loss 
prevention (Hine et al., 2013).  
Similar studies from health have shown that tailoring messages to specific segments 
can have positive impacts with health behavior interventions (Noar, Benac & Harris, 
2007).  Skinner, Campbell, Rimer, Curry & Prochaska (1999) found that tailored 
communications are better remembered as relevant and credible than non-tailored ones. 
Rimer and Glassman (1999) similarly found that tailored communications were effective 
in modifying behaviors in cancer patients than non-tailored ones. 
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With Canadians now segmented in their views on climate change, future research 
should focus on identifying how to tailor communications interventions that are the most 
effective for modifying behaviors by audience segment. By empirically testing the 
effectiveness of certain interventions (e.g. appeal to sense of community, moral or 
religious duty, egalitarian values, economic consequences) by segment, research can 
begin to test which interventions most effectively modify most effective for each 
population. Measurements must be set up to track the effectiveness of these interventions 
in causing migrations across segments, and more importantly improving pro-
environmental behaviors. 
 
Motivating Pro-Environmental Behaviors 
Residents of the most developed nations tend to be some of the highest emitters of 
GHGs per capita (Olivier et al., 2014). Even within Alarmed and Cautious segments, 
individuals may be well aware of the threats of climate change, while their daily 
behaviors may counter to that. It was noted earlier that the United States and Canada are 
some of the highest emitters of fossil fuels, despite having sizable populations that are at 
least aware of the consequences of climate change. Whether it is by taking long showers, 
flying excessively, heating large homes or driving large cars it is clear that knowing and 
willing, do not always lead to doing. This study found that people in most segments, 
other than the Doubtful and the Dismissive, agreed that people should do more to 
mitigate climate change. When asked about personal actions taken, most segments other 
than the Alarmed were doing little themselves (Table 6). More research is therefore 
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needed to better understand the gap between knowledge and action, and what motivators 
would entice individuals to minimise their carbon footprint.  
It was noted in this study that while the Alarmed and the Dismissive are the least 
likely to change their minds about climate change, the other segments were more open to 
change. The Disengaged and the Cautious were the most open to changing their views 
and together they represent 28% of the sample population (Figure 1). They might 
therefore serve as a suitable initial audience for experimental interventions aimed at 
improving behaviors. The other segments cannot be ignored however.  Members of the 
Dismissive are some of the most vocal and polarized audiences, and thus efforts at 
appealing to their values to neutralize some of their scientific skepticism may have 
potentiating effects by limiting the spread of their anti-scientific views. 
 
Targeting Albertans, Prairie Provinces and Conservatives 
The regression models showed that Albertans were statistically less likely to support 
GHG reduction polices than most other residents of Canada (Table 8), other than the 
Prairies (Manitoba and Saskatchewan). Alberta is well known for its Athabasca tar sands 
which play a substantial role in the economic prosperity of its citizens. Future research 
could focus on what interventions might help Albertans move between segments to being 
more accepting of climate change. Alberta’s economy is heavily reliant on fossil fuels, 
and thus research to help stimulate alternate energy development such renewables, or a 
more diversified economy could potentially shift views in this province. Albertans and 
other Canadians may feel conflicted between the need to act on climate and the economic 
incentives this nation receives from non-renewable energy production.   
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Similarly, Conservative voters in the 2015 Canadian federal election were 
significantly lower on the GHG Policy Index than all other parties. Gutstein (2014) 
argues that climate science denial is well embedded in the conservative ideology in 
Canada. Conservative funded think tanks like the Fraser Institute regularly publish 
research debunking climate science (for example Green, 2014) or GHG mitigating 
polices (for example Jackson & Eisen, 2015).  
Future research could focus on improving the trust the public has in science. The 
political right has seen success with communications that debunk science. This 
messaging enables Canadians to fuel their desires to profit from energy production, and 
perhaps to feel less need to take personal actions to reduce their carbon footprints. 
Additional research could therefore test the efficacy of promoting the economic benefits 
of becoming leaders in renewable development, especially in Alberta and the prairie 
provinces where the stakes of weaning off the tar sands economy is high. 
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Chapter V 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
There is little doubt within the scientific community about the need for immediate 
action to reduce the magnitude and impacts of ACC. To effectively reduce carbon and 
other greenhouse gas emissions effective climate solutions will require the engagement 
and collective action of millions of people and thousands of organizations in the United 
States and other countries including Canada. Unfortunately, there remains a gap between 
scientific knowledge and action from the general public. 
This study tested a discriminant segmentation tool to classify a nationally 
representative sample of Canadians into six distinct groups, homogenous in their beliefs, 
behaviors and preferences with respect to climate change. Audience segmentation is a 
methodology that has long been used to efficiently target communications to distinct 
groups of people based on their values, beliefs and motivations. This segmentation-tool 
groups citizens into segments that represent a continuum of belief in climate change, 
from the Alarmed – who believe climate change is a clear an imminent threat, to the 
Dismissive who largely reject the claims made by science. 
The segmentation tool successfully classified Canadians into six segments.  The 
proportion of Canadians in each segment was significantly different than that of 
Americans.  The effectiveness of these segments was validated by using the segments as 
predictors of a GHG Policy Index. The study additionally identified some demographic 
variables that were predictive in level for support for GHG policies and these included 
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gender, political ideology and voting behavior in the last Canadian federal election. 
Specifically, it found that being male, a resident of Alberta, or a Conservative Party 
member is statistically predictive of less support for the GHG Policy Index.    
Segmentation was the most significant predictor of support for the GHG Policy 
Index explaining 41% of the variance in this variable. This was much more powerful than 
the demographic model (8%) or political ideology (15%). Communications or polices 
that move people between segments towards the Alarmed, are therefore powerful tools to 
improve support for GHG mitigating policies. An interesting finding was that even 
amongst those who say we should take more action, their own consumer behaviors did 
not necessarily reflect their views.    
Segmentation provides communicators and policy makers with guidance on 
where to direct communication and research efforts. For the future, this tool and 
methodology provides a baseline and a framework to measure how Canadians view 
climate change over time, along with a basis for comparison with the United States. We 
can use that comparison to determine key differences between these two countries, and 
why, despite having the same predictors for policy support, the populations are 
segmented differently.   
Future research can use segments to empirically test the effectiveness of various 
communication strategies to improve belief within targeted homogenous populations. 
More importantly, through understanding the distinct values of the people within these 
segments interventions must be tested that will improve the pro-environmental behaviors 
of these groups, further closing the gap between belief and action.  
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Appendix 
Survey Questions and Response Coding 
Quest
ion 
# 
Lab
el 
Question Stem Responses and coding Recoding and 
missing data 
treatment 
1 Beli
ef1 
Recently you may have noticed 
that global warming has been 
getting some attention in the 
news. Global warming refers to 
the idea that the world’s 
average temperature has been 
increasing over the past 150 
years, may be increasing more 
in the future, and that the 
world’s climate may change as 
a result.  
What do you think? Do you 
think that global warming is 
happening? 
1. Extremely sure 
global warming is not 
happening   
2. Very sure global 
warming is not 
happening 
3.Somewhat sure 
global warming is not 
happening  
4. Not at all sure 
global warming is not 
happening   
5. Don’t know 
6. Not at all sure 
 global warming is 
 happening   
7. Somewhat sure 
 global warming is 
 happening   
8.Very sure global 
 warming is 
 happening   
9.Extremely sure 
 global warming is 
happening  
Calculate 
mean and 
substitute for 
missing data 
 
2 Beli
ef2 
Assuming global warming is 
happening, do you think it is ... 
1. Caused mostly by 
human activities 
2.Caused mostly by 
natural changes in the 
environment  
3.Other 
4.None of the above 
because global 
warming isn't 
This variable 
is recoded into 
three dummy 
variables. 
“Other” is the 
omitted 
response 
category.  
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Quest
ion 
# 
Lab
el 
Question Stem Responses and coding Recoding and 
missing data 
treatment 
happening Recoding of 
missing data 
on this item: if 
respondent 
said global 
warming is 
not  occurring 
on Belief1, 
respondent is 
coded as 4; if 
respondent 
said global 
warming is 
occurring on 
Belief1, s/he is 
coded as 1. 
The remainder 
are recoded as 
3. 
3 Inv1
5 
How worried are you about 
global warming? 
1.Not at all worried  
2.Not very worried 
3.Somewhat worried  
4.Very worried 
Calculate 
mean and 
substitute for 
missing data 
4 Beli
ef4 
How much do you think global 
warming will harm you 
personally? 
 
0.Don't know  
1.Not at all 
2.Only a little 
3.A moderate amount  
4.A great deal 
 
Calculate item 
mean 
excluding 
“don’t know” 
responses & 
substitute for 
missing data. 
This variable 
is recoded into 
dummy 
variables for 
discriminant 
analysis 
within the 
SPSS and 
SAS syntax. 
“Only a little” 
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Quest
ion 
# 
Lab
el 
Question Stem Responses and coding Recoding and 
missing data 
treatment 
is the omitted 
response 
category. 
5 Beli
ef7 
When do you think global 
warming will start to harm 
people in Canada? 
 
Original American Question: 
When do you think global 
warming will start to harm 
people in the United States? 
1.Never  
2.In 100 years 
3.In 50 years 
4.In 25 years 
5.In 10 years  
6.They are being 
harmed now 
Calculate 
mean and 
substitute for 
missing data 
 
6 Beli
ef5 
How much do you think global 
warming will harm future 
generations of people? 
0.Don't know  
1.Not at all 
2.Only a little 
3.A moderate amount  
4.A great deal 
Calculate item 
mean 
excluding 
“don’t know” 
responses & 
substitute for 
missing data. 
This variable 
is recoded into 
dummy 
variables for 
discriminant 
analysis. 
“Only a little” 
is the omitted 
response 
category.  
7 Inv1
6 
How much had you thought 
about global warming before 
today? 
1.Not at all  
2.A little  
3.Some 
4.A lot  
Calculate 
mean and 
substitute for 
missing data 
8 Inv1
8 
How important is the issue of 
global warming to you 
personally? 
1.Not at all important  
2.Not too important  
3.Somewhat important  
4.Very important  
5.Extremely important 
 
Calculate 
mean and 
substitute for 
missing data 
 78 
Quest
ion 
# 
Lab
el 
Question Stem Responses and coding Recoding and 
missing data 
treatment 
9 Inv1
9 
How much do you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statement: "I could easily 
change my mind about global 
warming." 
1.Strongly agree  
2.Somewhat agree  
3.Somewhat disagree 
4.Strongly disagree 
Calculate 
mean and 
substitute for 
missing data 
10 Inv2
2 
How many of your friends 
share your views on global 
warming? 
1.None  
2.A few  
3.Some  
4.Most  
5.All 
Calculate 
mean and 
substitute for 
missing data 
11 Beli
ef8 
Which of the following 
statements comes closest to 
your view? 
1.Global warming isn't 
happening. 
2.Humans can't reduce 
global warming, even 
if it is happening. 
3.Humans could 
reduce global 
warming, but people 
aren't willing to 
change their behavior 
so we're not going to. 
4.Humans could 
reduce global 
warming, but it's 
unclear at this point 
whether we will do 
what's needed. 
5.Humans can reduce 
global warming, and 
we are going to do so 
successfully. 
 
Calculate 
mean and 
substitute for 
missing data 
 
12 PSR
34 
Do you think citizens 
themselves should be doing 
more or less to address global 
warming? 
 
1.Much less 
2.Less 
3.Currently doing the 
right amount  
4More 
5.Much more 
 
Calculate 
mean and 
substitute for 
missing data 
13 Beha
vior
Over the past 12 months, how 
many times have you punished 
0.Don't know 
1.Never 
Calculate item 
mean 
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Quest
ion 
# 
Lab
el 
Question Stem Responses and coding Recoding and 
missing data 
treatment 
25 companies that are opposing 
steps to reduce global warming 
by NOT buying their products? 
2.Once 
3.A few times (2-3)  
4.Several times (4-5)  
5.Many times (6+)  
 
excluding 
“don’t know” 
responses & 
substitute for 
missing data. 
This variable 
is recoded into 
dummy 
variables for 
discriminant 
analysis. 
“Once” is the 
omitted 
response 
option.  
14 PSR
32 
Do you think global warming 
should be a low, medium, high, 
or very high priority for the 
Parliament and Provincial 
Legislatures? 
 
Original American Question: 
1.Low  
2.Medium  
3.High  
4.Very high 
 
Calculate 
mean and 
substitute for 
missing data 
15 PSR
36 
People disagree whether 
Canada should reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions on 
its own, or make reductions 
only if other countries do too. 
Which of the following 
statements comes closest to 
your own point of view? 
 
Canada should reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions ... 
 
Original American Question: 
People disagree whether the 
United States should reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions on 
its own, or make reductions 
only if other countries do too. 
Which of the following 
0.Don't know 
1.Canada should not 
reduce its emissions  
(1.The United States 
should not reduce its 
emissions) 
2.Only if other 
industrialized 
countries and 
developing countries 
(such as China, India 
and Brazil) reduce 
their emissions 
3.Only if other 
industrialized 
countries (such as the 
United States, 
England, Germany and 
Japan) reduce their 
Calculate item 
mean 
excluding 
“don’t know” 
responses & 
substitute for 
missing data. 
This variable 
is recoded into 
dummy 
variables for 
discriminant 
analysis 
within the 
SPSS and 
SAS syntax.  
“Only if other 
industrialized 
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Quest
ion 
# 
Lab
el 
Question Stem Responses and coding Recoding and 
missing data 
treatment 
statements comes closest to 
your own point of view? 
 
The United States should 
reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions ... 
 
 
emissions 
(3.Only if other 
industrialized 
countries (such as the  
England, Germany 
and Japan) reduce 
their emissions) 
4.Regardless of what 
other countries do 
 
American responses 
italicized above 
countries 
reduce” is the 
omitted 
response 
option. 
16 PRE
F1 
Establish a special fund to help 
make buildings more energy 
efficient and teach Canadians 
(Americans)how to reduce 
their energy use. This would 
add a $2.50 surcharge to the 
average household’s monthly 
electric bill. 
 
For each of the 
questions PREF1-
PREF9 use the 
following scale and 
coding. 
 
1. Strongly oppose 
2. Oppose 
3. Support 
4. Strongly support 
 
Calculate 
mean by 
segment and 
substitute 
missing data. 
17 PRE
F2 
Provide a government subsidy 
to replace old water heaters, air 
conditioners, light bulbs, and 
insulation. This subsidy would 
cost the average household $5 
a month in higher taxes. Those 
who took advantage of the 
program would save money on 
their utility bills. 
 
Calculate 
mean by 
segment and 
substitute 
missing data. 
18 PRE
F3 
Adopt a carbon tax scheme (on 
carbon dioxide - the primary 
greenhouse gas) that applies to 
all polluters of carbon-whether 
individuals or businesses. 
Calculate 
mean by 
segment and 
substitute 
missing data. 
19 PRE
F4 
Require electric utilities to 
produce at least 20% of their 
electricity from wind, solar, or 
other renewable energy 
sources, even if it cost the 
Calculate 
mean by 
segment and 
substitute 
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Quest
ion 
# 
Lab
el 
Question Stem Responses and coding Recoding and 
missing data 
treatment 
average household an extra 
$100 a year. 
missing data. 
20 PRE
F5 
Sign an international treaty that 
requires (The United States) 
Canada to cut its emissions of 
carbon dioxide 90% by the 
year 2050. 
Calculate 
mean by 
segment and 
substitute 
missing data. 
21 PRE
F6 
Require automakers to increase 
the fuel efficiency of cars, 
trucks, and SUVS, to 45 mpg, 
even if it means a new vehicle 
will cost up to $1,000 more to 
buy. 
Calculate 
mean by 
segment and 
substitute 
missing data. 
22 PRE
F7 
Fund more research into 
renewable energy sources, such 
as solar and wind power. 
Calculate 
mean by 
segment and 
substitute 
missing data. 
Calculate 
mean by 
segment and 
substitute 
missing data. 
23 PRE
F8 
Provide tax rebates for people 
who purchase energy-efficient 
vehicles or solar panels. 
Calculate 
mean by 
segment and 
substitute 
missing data. 
24 PRE
F9 
Increase taxes on gasoline by 8 
cents per liter and return the 
revenues to taxpayers by 
reducing the federal income 
tax. 
Calculate 
mean by 
segment and 
substitute 
missing data. 
25 DE
M1 
(*Note many of these 
demographic questions were 
not asked in the Six Americas 
study.  These were constructed 
specifically for this study) 
1.18 to 24 years 
2. 25 to 34 years 
3.35 to 44 years 
4.45 to 54 years 
5. 55 to 65 years 
Leger Survey 
has under 198 
option which 
clicks them 
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Quest
ion 
# 
Lab
el 
Question Stem Responses and coding Recoding and 
missing data 
treatment 
 
My age is: 
6. 65+ years 
 
out of survey 
26 DE
M2 
I primarily identify as: 1. Female 
2. Male 
 
27 DE
M3 
My primary residence is in: 1. Alberta 
2. British Columbia 
3. Manitoba 
4. New Brunswick 
5. Newfoundland 
6. Nova Scotia 
7. Ontario  
8. Prince Edward 
Island 
9. Quebec  
10. Saskatchewan 
11. Territories 
 
 
28 DE
M4 
My highest level of education 
completed is: 
1.No high school 
2.High school diploma 
3.Post-secondary 
certificate or CEGEP 
4.2-year post-
secondary diploma 
5.Undergraduate 
degree 
6.Graduate degree 
 
 
29 DE
M5 
My annual household income 
level is (including all members 
of household): 
1.Less than $50,000 
2.$50,000 to 100,000 
3.$100,001 to 
$150,000 
4.$150,000+ 
 
 
30 DE
M6 
My current employment status 
is: 
1.Not employed 
2.Part-time 
3.Full-time 
4.Retired 
 
 
31 DE
M7 
I primarily identify myself as 
 
1.White 
2.Hispanic 
3.Asian 
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Quest
ion 
# 
Lab
el 
Question Stem Responses and coding Recoding and 
missing data 
treatment 
4.Black 
5.First Nations/ Metis/ 
Inuit 
6.Other 
 
32 DE
M8 
I would describe my political 
ideology as: 
 
1.Very conservative 
(right wing) 
2.Somewhat 
conservative (right of 
centre) 
3.Centrist (neither 
right nor left wing) 
4.Somewhat liberal 
(left of centre) 
5.Very liberal (left-
wing) 
 
 
33 DE
M9 
In the last Federal election I 
voted for a candidate from: 
1.The Conservative 
Party of Canada 
2.The Liberal Party of 
Canada 
3.The New 
Democratic Party 
(NDP) 
4.The Green Party of 
Canada 
5.The Bloc Quebecois 
6.Other or did not vote 
 
 
Questions were taken from Maibach et al. (2011b) and adjusted for the Canadian 
audience. 
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